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DEDICATION 
To my son, Almekdam 
To the children of Palestine 
To the children of stones 
To Palestine's children who rewrite the history of their national struggle 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
It is easy for each of us, as human beings, to accuse people with whom 
we disagree of being "biased." Although there is no one scientifically 
accepted criterion by which to determine bias, there have been a variety of 
definitions and explanations of news bias provided by researchers, theorists 
and scholars. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, bias means "leaning of the mind 
toward or away from something; predisposition." News coverage bias has 
been the focus of many studies. Cirino (1968) categorized the hidden bias 
types as follows: (1) bias in the source, (2) bias through selection, (3) bias 
through omission, (4) bias through placement, (5) bias through coincidental 
placement, (6) bias in headlines, (7) bias in words, (8) bias in photograph 
selection, (9) bias in captions, (10) bias in use of editorials to distort facts, and 
(11) bias in interviewing. To develop a list of the words used as synonyms or 
antonyms for reportorial bias, Doll and Bradley (1974) surveyed journalism 
textbooks. They found such synonyms as "preferential, loaded, partisan, one 
sided, dose minded, opinionated, warped, slanted, distorted, colored, 
dressed-up, indirect, partial, hints, touched up, angled, special pleading, 
prejudiced, manipulatory, editorializing, stereotyped, prepossessing, 
dishonest, and subjective." They also found that antonyms for bias were 
"open mindfulness, quantified, honest, straight-forward, equally forceful, 
factual, factually accurate, neutral, truthful, fair, and objective" (p. 256). 
Some researchers have defined objectivity as the opposite of bias. The concept 
of bias versus objectivity in the news media is frequently associated with 
2 
political and ideological impact (Hackett, 1985). On November 25,1968, in the 
CBS broadcast, 60 Minutes, Walter Cronkite said that "objectivity is when 
one tries to be objective." Doll and Bradley (1974) defined bias as "the absence 
of objectivity" (p. 256). Hackett further noted that the concept of news bias has 
two elements. One is a lack of "balance" between competing viewpoints; the 
other is a tendentious, partisan editorial of reality (1985, p. 252). 
According to Hofstetter and Buss (1978) another aspect of bias is 
selectivity "which may or may not lead to the unbalanced, inequitable or 
unfair treatment of individuals or issues" (p. 518). They explained that 
"when reporters are accused of being biased, they are selecting facts to 
represent a story so that the end results are imbalanced, inequitable or 
unfair" (p. 518). Obviously reporters, editors, and producers are the ones who 
usually choose, omit, or interrelate facts. "Any time one abstracts or 
generalizes, one is selecting certain details rather than others"(p.518) 
Therefore, choosing, omitting, or interrelating facts in some coherent way 
are based on judgment of relevance, which "is determined by journalists’ 
view of the world" (Hofstetter and Buss, 1978, p. 518). 
If news coverage is limited by pressure of time and space, the limitations 
of news coverage are much worse within events relating to historically 
controversial issues. The current issue in the Middle East, that is, the 
conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis, is a labyrinth. Religion, culture, 
politics, history, geography and racism are all various dimensions of the 
Middle East conflict. The problem is that the world community listened only 
to one side and gave no attention to the other side of this conflict. Arnold 
Toynbee said that "right and wrong are the same in Palestine as anywhere 
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else. What is peculiar about the Palestine conflict is that the world has 
listened to the party that committed the offense and has turned a deaf ear to 
the victims" (Kayyali, 1979, p. 5). 
In the U.S. particularly, the media have portrayed Arabs negatively, 
while Israel has been portrayed positively. According to Asi, "this negative 
exposure was prevalent in all mass media. From elementary school 
textbooks to the New York Times and television entertainment, Americans 
were exposed consistently to messages which tended to portray the Arabs 
negatively" (p. 45). In contrast, he states that "Israel and Israelis enjoy 
sympathy among most Americans and were portrayed more often than not in 
a favorable light. Israeli actions, regardless of how crude and brutal they 
might be, were presented and explained as 'justified self defense,' or 
’retaliation’ to Arab provocations" (Asi, 1981, p. 45). 
Causes and Effects 
This conflict cannot be separated from the historical heritage of 
controversy and opposition between Western philosophy and the Islamic- 
Arab philosophy. Although the conflict in the Middle East involves Israelis 
and Palestinians, it is also a struggle between two cultures; the Islamic-Arab 
culture on one side and the Western culture on the other. The struggle of 
Palestinians against Israeli occupation is only one chapter in the long book of 
conflict. 
The controversy began as Islam emerged in Western Asia, and since the 
Middle Ages, the West has had a suspicious attitude toward Islam, its 
prophet, and its holy book. "There the prophet is generally displayed as an 
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imposter, a false prophet, al-Koran as his pretentious fabrication and Islam 
as a licentious way of life, both here and in the next world" (Hitti, 1979, p. 48). 
Oxtobys (1980) believed that the first negative stereotypes about Islam 
emerged in the seventeenth-century translation of al-Koran by Alexander 
Ross, in which he cautioned readers of the "danger in reading al-Koran" (p. 
3). 
As fear, hostility, and prejudice grew, evoking action and reaction 
among Europeans and Moslems, perhaps the bloodiest chapter was written 
at the time of the Crusades. "The first Crusade began in 1095 after the 
Byzantines-threatened by Seljuk power—appealed to Pope Urban II for 
military aid. Pope Urban, hoping to divert the Christian King and princes 
from their struggles with each other . . . and to reunite the Eastern and 
Western churches, called for a Truce of God among the rulers of Europe and 
urged them to take the Holy Land from the Muslims" (Nawwab, Speers and 
Hoye, 1981, p. 81). 
Another stage in the conflict was the British-French colonization of the 
Middle East, including the area known as Palestine. This colonization 
occurred as an outcome of the First World War and the consequent 
fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire (Hitti, 1979). Since the end of World 
War II, all British colonies in the Arab World were relinquished except 
Palestine. Subsequent to many Jewish attempts with several European 
nations, British Foreign Minister Balfoure in 1917 promised a Jewish home 
in Palestine. This later came to be known as the Balfour Declaration. On 
November 29, 1947, the United Nations authorized a Palestine-partition plan 
that gave a part of Palestine to the Jews. In 1948, Israel was recognized as a 
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Jewish state by U.S. President Harry Truman. "This development occurred 
against the will of the indigenous Palestinian people and against the 
acceptance of the Arab masses" (Asi, 1981, p. 9). 
This partition was accomplished after many previous attempts by the 
Zionist Movement-the organization that has occasioned much controversy 
and protracted debate over its aims and historic roots. Although the explicit 
aim of this organization was "to create a Jewish nationalism expressed in 
the form of a Jewish national state in Palestine" (Gainsborough, 1986, p. 3), 
there are people who argue that it is "a colonial movement based on racist, 
supremacist and distant religious notions perceived and launched as a 
political project within the imperialist framework of late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century Europe" (Kayyali, 1979, p. 5). In fact, the United 
Nations Resolution 3379 of November 1975 concluded debate by declaring that 
Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination (Kayyali, 1979). 
Although the Jewish state already held 55 percent of Palestinian land, 
the Zionists' dream was to control the surrounding Arab land. Theodore 
Hertzl, the founder of the Zionist Movement, described the Jewish State as 
extending"... from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates" (Epp, 1970, p. 15). 
"With the Palestine War in 1948, an additional 22 percent of this land was 
incorporated into the newly self-proclaimed state of Israel. In the 1967 war, 
the territories under the Israeli control were further extended to include all 
the land west of Jordan, plus the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights of 
Syria" (Epp, 1970, p. 14). Israel also invaded Lebanon in 1982 and is still 
occupying the southern part of this country. 
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There is no indication that the historical gap between Western culture 
and the Islamic culture will be narrowed or ended anytime soon. On the 
contrary, Shah (1990), editor of the Eastern Times of Washington, D.C. 
pointed out that "the Muslim anger against the West is derived mostly from 
specific acts and policies of Western nations, which leave the perception that 
justice and fairness do not matter when the lives of Westerners are not at 
stake." Shah says that the 1990 "summit between the two superpowers 
featured talk of a long era of confrontation giving way to an era of enduring 
cooperation. But in the Muslim world, there are fears that the end of the cold 
war will encourage a new cold war with the Muslim world" (p. 19). With the 
apparent end of the cold war, the Soviet Union is flooding Israel's immigrant 
population. Thousands of Soviet Jewish immigrants already have been 
forced to leave for Palestine and thousands more are expected to leave later. 
Agres (1990) reported that "at this moment, there are Jews in the USSR in 
possession of plane tickets for January 1991. The government's budget for the 
year 1991 took into account only 40,000 immigrants, but it is now clear that a 
realistic estimate would be 80,000-120,000, and possibly more" (p. 33). 
Ironically, another factor that has made Israel seem to be the West's 
favorite son in the Middle East is a backlash against anti-Semitism, 
"attitudes and actions against Jews based on the belief that Jews are uniquely 
inferior, evil or deserving of condemnation by their very nature or by 
historical or supernatural dictates” (Grosser and Halperin, 1983, p. 5). Many 
Americans in the United States oppose Anti-Semitism and have tried to 
change such sentiments. Bell (1980) pointed out that "Americans have an 
automatic sympathy toward the Jews of Israel because of the Holocaust. One 
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could even say Americans feel guilt on the issue" (p. 56). The efforts to oppose 
anti-Semitism however, have indirectly and directly victimized other people. 
Some people are an easy target to be accused as anti-Semitic for political or 
cultural orientation, which has nothing to do with anti-Semitism attitudes. 
Caradon (1980) writes that "Anti-Semitism is one of the most evil things in 
the world, but the unjustified accusation of being anti-Semitic is also evil, and 
too frequently employed" (p. 80). The Arabs, as an Israeli's enemy in the 
Middle East, are among those targets. "An old anti-Semitism directed 
against the Semitic Jews now became a new anti-Semitism directed against 
the Semitic Arabs. As the old anti-Semitism terribly wronged the Jews, so 
the new anti-Semitism terribly wronged the Arabs" (Epp, 1970, p. 6). Even in 
American motion pictures there are indications that Arabs are treated as 
negatively as Jews were in Hitler's Germany. Shaheen (1986) says "The 
image of the Arab in most films parallels the image of the Jew in pre-Nazi 
Germany" (p. 1). 
There is another factor that has contributed strongly to the negative 
Arab image in the American press. Despite their minority status in most 
countries, Jews play a dominant economic role. They have an active 
presence, whether in industrialized, developing, communist or capitalist 
countries. In the United States, Jews are believed by many people to play a 
decisive role at several levels. 
Efforts by the pro-Israel lobby to influence American opinion and 
policy most often focuses on national institutions, particularly 
the federal government. Yet the lobby in its various forms 
branches quite widely into American life beyond the seat of 
government on the banks of the Potomac River. Local political 
leaders, businesses, organizations and private individuals in 
many fields experience unfair criticism and intimidation for 
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becoming involved in the debate over the Middle East issue" 
(Findley, 1985, p. 287). 
Jews and their pro-Israeli supporters put pressure upon the U.S. 
Congress to achieve their goals in the Middle East. The Jewish lobbying 
effort can be accomplished in this country through more than 200 national 
groups, but perhaps the most powerful and effective foreign policy group is 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Findely writes that 
"It has effectively gained control of virtually all of Capitol Hill's action on the 
Middle East policy. Almost without exception, House and Senate members do 
its bidding, because most of them consider AIPAC to be the direct Capitol Hill 
representative of a political force that can make or break their chance at 
election time" (p. 25). Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey is among the few public 
officials to reveal that the "Congress is terrorized by AIPAC" (Findley, 1985, 
p. 27). 
If the Jewish Israeli lobbyists have been able to exert pressures and 
influence upon the highest institutions of the decision-making process in the 
United States, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that they influence 
many segments of the private sector as well, including the American mass 
media. This influence may be the result of the ideology and background of 
the journalists, broadcasters and producers of the news media. In his study 
of American news decision-makers, Lichter (1981) found "a widespread 
commitment to Israel among the media elite. Of the 238 respondents in his 
study, 235 were willing to express an opinion about this commitment. Fully 
72 percent agreed that the U.S. was morally obligated to defend Israel, with 
more than one in the three respondents indicating strong agreement with 
that proposition" (p. 43). In another study, Epstein pointed out that 58 percent 
9 
of the network producers and editors he interviewed were of Jewish descent 
(1973, pp. 222-23). 
As Israel has attacked and threatened several Arab countries (Lebanon, 
Iraq, Tunisia) during the last 15 years, with the blessing and sometimes the 
encouragement of the U.S., frustration, anger and anti-American 
sentiments have been generated in the Arab World. These sentiments, 
which have been transformed into direct actions such as the taking of 
American hostages, kidnapping and other terrorist activities, have 
frequently dominated U.S. media coverage of the Middle East at the expense 
of ignoring fundamental issues in the region such as the Israeli occupation 
of the Arab lands. International news is usually seen from a national angle. 
Adams and Heyl (1981) noted that "International news anywhere in the 
world tends to be ethnocentric. Foremost, people are concerned about their 
own country and its place in the world. In the U.S., international relations 
usually means bilateral relations between the U.S. and any other country" (p. 
13). 
Although most studies of the American media coverage of the Middle 
East have concluded that the national media have treated the Israelis more 
favorably than the Arabs (Howard, 1967; Farmer, 1968; Suleiman, 1965,1970; 
Wagner, 1973; Zaremba, 1977), several recent studies suggest a gradual shift 
toward more neutral coverage or more positive portrayals of the Arab nations 
(Asi, 1981; Belkaoui, 1978; Gordon, 1975). Some researchers have attributed 
such a shift to specific events in the Middle East during the last 18 years. 
There have been many Arab-Israeli wars in the last 42 years. But, it 
was the 1973 war that provoked the Arab oil embargo against any nation that 
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supported Israeli aggression and this drew much of the media attention to 
the Middle East. Peter Jennings, the ABC Middle East correspondent, 
admitted that "more coverage has been given to Israel's side than to that of 
the Arab." This situation, however, he said "began to change, not 
dramatically perhaps, but substantially after the October war in 1973 and 
particularly after the Arab oil embargo" (Ghareeb, 1983, pp. 127-28). 
Others have suggested more recent events that have contributed to such 
a shift. They cite, for example, Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat's visit to 
Israel in 1977 (Bagnied and Schneider, 1981) and the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon (Roeh, 1981). 
With few exceptions, most of these studies have dealt with one-time 
events. The media coverage of an extraordinary event may not reflect a long¬ 
term change in editorial policy of the news decision-makers. For example, 
although Israel's activities in Southern Lebanon during the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon received unfavorable coverage in the U.S. media, other Israeli 
attacks in different areas or at different times were not treated similarly. In 
other words, the invasion of Lebanon and the Egyptian president's visit to 
Israel in 1977 are extraordinary events, where media have little if any role to 
play over the events. 
Study Focus 
The current study deals specifically with the U.S. television coverage of 
the Middle East. Television is an effective news medium, especially in the 
United States. Bamouw (1978) said that "Most Americans now depend 
mainly on the television for information about what's going on in the world 
11 
today. Most people say they trust television more than any other news 
medium, and many seem to rely almost wholly on television" (p. 1). 
Television's power comes basically from its combined visual and verbal 
content. Television is a two-channel medium. Both channels function as 
one outlet and convey one content. Kepplinger (1982) indicates that "the two 
will present the same or a similar picture of reality. ... If there are 
significant differences between verbal and visual content, only one of the two 
presentations can be appropriate" (pp. 391-92). Thus, verbal and visual 
contents should reinforce each other to avoid a possible lack of neutrality and 
credibility. Although the network personnel hold substantial power over the 
pictures they broadcast, Adams (1978) pointed out that "They exert much less 
overt control over the part of the visual image emerging from the news 
happening itself (event factors)" (p. 156). Adams defines the event factors as 
"those that are outside of direct network control" (p. 156). 
For the purpose of this study, a content analysis of three American 
commercial television networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) will be conducted. To 
determine whether there may be a possible long-term shift in U.S. television 
coverage of the Middle East conflict, or whether such a shift is derived from 
one-time event coverage, an "event factors" approach will be applied during 
two different time periods: 
1. One year before the Palestinian uprising (December 1, 1986-November 
30,1987) which is considered in this study an ordinary event period. 
2. ' The first year of the Palestinian uprising (January 1988-December 30, 
1988) which is considered in this study an extraordinary event period. 
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CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND 
The Palestinian Uprising Intifada 
If indeed the pictures of present conflicts can be manipulated by 
journalists and their tools, it would be fair to say that the picture of conflicts 
in the past might have been manipulated by historians and their tools. 
On the eve of the termination of the British mandate over Palestine in 
May 1948, members of the people's council and representatives of the Jewish 
community of Ertz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement, in accordance with 
their "natural and historic right" and on the strength of the resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the State of Israel (Cattan, 
1988) (see Appendix A). 
If historic rights justify occupation of a land and expulsion of its people, 
many nations and peoples would disappear from the maps of the world. 
Although the concept of an "Israel state" was generated and developed 
based on the Jewish claim of historic right to Palestine, a careful view of 
history reveals little support for this claim. Unlike the Palestinians, the 
Jews are not descendants of the land's original inhabitants: The Jews 
emigrated to Palestine from Egypt. Even though the Jews ruled the country 
for a time, they disappeared from Palestine altogether after the destruction of 
Israel and the Kingdom of Judah. Furthermore Jewish rule in Palestine did 
not last longer than the rules of other peoples. Professor Noth notes that the 
Israeli monarchy continued for two and a half centuries as an independent 
institution in the two states of Israel and Judah and for one century and a 
half in the vassal monarchy of Judah (Noth, 1970, p. 299). But “Christian 
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rule, Byzantine and Crusader, lasted four centuries while Moslem rule, 
Arab and Turkish, continued for twelve centuries” (Cattan, 1988, p. 18). 
Another indication of the falsehood of the historical claim of Jews to 
Palestine is that before the creation of Israel, the Zionists nominated six 
countries to be chosen as a location for Israel. Zayad (1980) states that 
Uganda, Tripolitani in Libya, Cyprus, Madagascar, the Congo, and Palestine 
were all options explored as locations for the Zionist enclave. When the 
interest of European Imperialism, however, met the interest of Zionism, the 
choice fell on Palestine. In the minds of many, this state was designed to 
“form a part of a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization 
against barbarism” (Herzl, 1943, p. 30). 
The international community has not always accepted claims by Jews to 
Palestine. In 1919 the Paris Peace Conference rejected the Zionist claim for 
recognition of a Jewish historic title to Palestine. Instead, the conference 
decided that Arab territories detached from Turkey should be administered 
by a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations. The historic right of the 
Jews in Palestine was also rejected by the British government, which had the 
Palestine mandate at that time (Cattan, 1988). As to the claim of the United 
Nations General Assembly resolution, “apart from its doubtful validity and 
legality, it was not respected because the state that emerged did not conform 
to the UN resolution on which it purported to be based, either 
demographically or territorially” (Cattan, 1988, p. 50). 
Eventually, the Balfoure Declaration did support a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. But although the British government expressed its support for 
establishing a Jewish “national home” in Palestine, both before and after the 
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acceptance of the mandate from the League of Nations, the British rejected 
the implication that a "national home" meant a Jewish state (Adams, 1979). 
Although there were Zionists who were aware of the Palestinian 
population in Palestine and “tried to warn their colleagues against the 
danger of implanting a Jewish national entity on Arab soil” (Adams, 1979, p. 
118), their viewpoint eventually was obscured from the world community, 
and the Palestinian people were dispossessed by the claim that "Land 
without people is for people without land." Contrary to this statement, the 
majority of the Palestine population was Arab. However, “The partition 
resolution allotted the proposed Jewish state 56 percent of the total area of 
Palestine at the time when Jewish ownership of the land did not exceed 6 
percent of the total area" (Epp, 1970, p. 184). In 1919, the population of 
Palestine included about 65,000 Jews, many of whom were Arabized Jews of 
long standing, and about 650,000 Arabs. In 1922, the first official British 
census of Palestine, as well as later counts, revealed the population of each 
party (Table 1). 
Jewish land ownership in Palestine was only about 2 percent in 1922. 
This figure had increased to about 5.67 percent in 1945, as shown in Table 2. 
It was obvious from the beginning that such a state could be established 
only by violating the rights of the Arab population. And in fact the Arab 
majority was forcibly displaced and uprooted by a militant minority of foreign 
origin. Cattan points out that in 1948 "a million Palestinians were expelled 
or otherwise forced to leave their homes, towns and villages, were robbed of 
their lands, properties and possessions and became refugees without homes 
and without any means of livelihood” (p. 60). Said (1979) states that three and 
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Table 1. Statistical summary of the population in Palestine (1922-IQS?)3 
Year Moslem Jews Christians Others Total 
1922 598,177 83,790 71,464 7,617 761,048 
1924 627,660 94,945 74,094 8,263 804,962 
1926 663,613 149,500 76,764 8,782 898,659 
1928 695,280 151,656 79,812 9,203 935,951 
1930 733,149 164,796 84,986 9,628 992,559 
1932 771,180 180,793 90,624 10,281 1,052,872 
1934 807,180 253,700 99,532 10,746 1,171,158 
1936 848,342 370,483 106,474 11,219 1,336,518 
1937 875,947 386,074 109,764 11,520 1,383,305 
8Palestine Blue Book 1937. Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1937. 
Table 2. Land ownership in Palestine (1945)a 
Category Acres Percent 
Individually owned by Arabs 3,143,693 74.79 
Individually owned by Jews 372,925 5.67 
Others 35,512 .54 
Registered & recorded State Domain 3,028,625 46.00 
Total 6,580,755 100 
aSami Hadawi, Land Ownership in Palestine 1957 (p. 12). 
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a half million Arabs have been scattered throughout the world. About 
650.000 of those displaced are called Israeli Arabs^-one million of whom live 
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, smother one million or so in Jordan, nearly 
450.000 in Lebanon, and the balance dispersed throughout either the Gulf 
states, including Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq, or in Europe and the 
Americas. 
The conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis occurred as soon as the 
Jewish state came into being. The promises of equality of citizenship were 
exposed as false: 
the question arose of who was entitled to live in the new state. Its 
boundaries had been extended far beyond those envisaged in the 
UN Partition Plan and the great majority of the Palestinians 
whose homes were within those boundaries fled into exile, some 
out of a simple instinct for self preservation, others because they 
had been forcibly expelled by the Israelis (Adams, 1979, p. 121). 
Cattan (1988) attributes the exodus of the Palestinians in 1948 to three 
causes: Jewish terrorism, expulsion, and security breakdown. Adams 
(1979) posed an additional cause, which is legal machinery during the last 
few months of the mandate. 
Jewish terrorism 
Although the Israeli authority forced some Palestinians to take refuge 
in neighboring Arab countries, the exodus started to assume catastrophic 
dimensions only after the outbreak of terrorism. The Dair Yassin massacre 
was calculated to terrorize Palestinians. According to Menachem Begin, 
former Prime Minister of Israel, because of the Dair Yassin Massacre, “the 
Arabs began to flee in terror ... of about 800,000 Arabs who lived in the 
17 
present territory of the state of Israel, only some 165,000 are still there” 
(Begin, 1951, pp 164-5). Jewish terrorism was concentrated on villages 
populated mainly by Arabs. 
Expulsion 
The expulsion of the Arabs occurred in several towns and villages and 
the Israeli authority prevented any official readmission of the Palestinians 
once expelled. Recent revelations in the Israeli press, however, have 
shattered the Israeli propaganda that the exodus of 1948 was either voluntary 
or ordered by the Arab states (Cattan,-1988). 
Breakdown of security before the end of the League of Nations mandate 
The third cause of the exodus of the Palestine Arabs was the collapse of 
security and of the government's machinery. During the last six months of 
the mandate, and after the violence and terrorism following the UN Partition 
Plan, the British government was neither able to maintain law in the area 
nor willing to commit forces for that purpose (Cattan, 1988). 
Discriminatory laws 
Adams (1979) states that for Arabs in Palestine, there could be no way to 
share, on equal terms, the benefits of a state structure designed to further the 
interests of the Jews. This inequality was reinforced by a series of laws, such 
as the Defense Laws, designed to reduce Arab participation in society. Along 
with the Defense Laws, there were laws of more far-reaching effects on 
Palestinians. "These laws were passed between 1948 and 1958 with the 
express aim of taking land away from its Arab owners and cultivators and 
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transferring it to Jewish control" (Adams, 1979, pp 125-6). There was also 
smother law, termed the "Transfer Committee," which was designed to expel 
the Palestinians either to other areas under Israeli control or across the 
armistice lines into the neighboring Arab countries. Arabs living in what 
were called "security areas" were ordered to leave and forbidden to return. 
Once Arab-owned land was left uncultivated, it was expropriated under the 
"Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Land" (Adams, 
1979). Another law was the "Law of Prescription," enacted in April 1958, 
which stated that anyone claiming ownership of a piece of land must prove 
that he or she had controlled and cultivated that land for 15 years (Adams, 
1979). 
After 1967, the Israeli policy toward the Palestinians was based on the 
techniques used before and after the 1948 war. Adams (1979) enumerates the 
techniques of repression imposed upon the Palestinians after 1967: 
1. detention without trial, 
2. destruction of houses, 
3. punitive curfews, 
4. deportations, and 
5. expropriation of land. 
The Palestinian Liberation Movements 
It should first be noted that during the Ottoman empire, there were no 
frontiers defining Palestine. Instead, Palestine and its people were 
considered part of Ottoman-dominated Syria. Nevertheless, there were 
Palestinian nationals among the Syrian nationals. "After separation of 
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Palestine from Syria, with imposition of British hegemony on the country in 
the guise of a League of Nations Mandate, and aroused by the spectre of a 
rapidly rising and competitive Jewish nationalist movement, the 
Palestinians began to form their own separate national organizations" 
(Ward, Peretz and Wilson, 1977, p. 5). 
Before reviewing the history of relevant national movements, it is 
essential to determine the identity of the Palestinians. The Arab character of 
Palestine and of the majority of its people, until recent years, in terms of 
language, culture, and historical background constitute an undeniable 
identity. Strong nationalist sentiment among the Palestinians from the 
beginning of the struggle has obviously received the backing from the 
surrounding Arab states and the goals of the Palestinians have been linked to 
those of Arab nationalists. Whereas most Palestinians were peasants and 
desert nomads or beduins, a small number of landowners and a middle class 
of businessmen dominated the society. These persons were wealthy, well- 
educated, and in dose contact with Europeans. Overall, during the mandate 
period, income in Palestine had risen to the highest level in the Arab World 
(Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977). 
The political elite of Palestinian soriety faced traditional rivalries among 
the leading families-the two most influential being the Husainis and the 
Nashashibis (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977). 
The first Palestinian resistance group was found in 1935 after the 
discovery of arms smuggling to the Hagana. The resistance was led by 
Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qasam. In 1936, all Palestinians joined in a general 
strike against the British authority and boycotted the Jewish community. By 
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1938, organized Arab guerrillas had become powerful enough to take over 
many areas of Palestine. The Jewish community of Palestine at that time, 
however, was in a stronger position than it would be again before the end of 
World War II (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977). 
Khouri (1983) summarizes the historical crossroads influencing the 
Palestinian struggle: 
The trauma of the Arab defeat in 1948 temporarily paralyzed the 
Palestinians, politically and militarily. Soon, Palestinian political 
energies were channeled into the pan-Arab movement in the hope 
that a strong, unified Arab nation would help them liberate 
Palestine.. . . Following the breakup of the UAR in 1961 and the 
successful outcome of the Algerian revolution in 1962, some 
Palestinian nationalists began to organize commando units to 
advocate the liberation of Palestine through their own independent, 
armed struggle (p. 130). 
According to Khouri, "after the Arab defeat in 1967, Palestinian nationalism 
intensified and spread, and new activist leaders took control of the PLO and 
the Palestinian national movement." 
In the history of the Palestinian struggle, there has always been political 
competition between the nationalists and the Islamists. Although the Middle 
East has recently witnessed an upsurge in Islamic movements challenging 
corrupt governments in several countries, Islamic movements are as old as 
nationalistic movements. Palestine has not been immune to this 
phenomenon, of course, having witnessed in 1946 the first Muslim 
Brotherhood movement to be established in Jerusalem. Later in the same 
year, Musa al-Huseini established other like groups in Jaffa, Lydda, Haifa, 
Nablus, and Tulkarem (Cohen, 1982). This movement, which was welcomed 
by the nationalists, was not welcomed by all Arab governments (Shadid, 
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1988), but participation of Brotherhood volunteers in the 1948 war brought 
many Palestinian Moslems into the movement. After the Moslem Brothers 
Movement in Egypt attempted to assassinate President Gamal Abd al-Naser, 
the movement was banned in Gaza (at that time, Gaza was ruled by Egypt) 
and the movement's activities were forced underground. Since 1954, the 
movement has organized a series of underground groups to conduct armed 
actions against Israel. Some of its members later joined Fatah and became 
senior PLO leaders (Shadid, 1988). The Islamists' situation in the West Bank 
was quite different, however, because the movement's efforts were devoted 
only to teaching movement principles without any clandestine military 
activities. After the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, military resistance against the Israeli occupation escalated 
as a result of the growing power of the PLO in Jordan. Resistance declined 
later, however, following the expulsion of PLO forces from Jordan in 1970-71 
and Israel's deportation of West Bank Arab leadership (Shadid, 1988). 
Recently, the Iranian revolution has contributed to the reemergence of the 
Brotherhood in the Occupied Arab territories, as well as in the rest of the 
Middle East (Shadid, 1988). 
To reunify and reorganize the Palestinian struggle, in 1964 a number of 
Arab states created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which 
consists of several groups (Appendix B). The PLO and the Fatah began to be 
viewed as representatives of mainstream Palestinian thought. And 
gradually, the PLO transformed itself into the most authentic representative 
of the Palestinians and into the key political Palestinian force. Many 
changes in the Palestinian position have taken place since the creation of the 
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PLO; originally calling for the destruction of Israel, the group now advocates 
coexistence of states in Palestine. But Palestinian demands of all nationalist 
leaders, regardless of party or status, have remained the same: rejection of 
the British promise to create a Jewish state in Palestine, establishment of a 
national government responsible to a council elected by the Arabic speaking 
people of Palestine, cessation of land sales to Jews, withdrawal of recognition 
of Hebrew as an official language, and ban of the Zionist flag; in short, 
national independence under Arab control (Ward, Peretz, and Wilson, 1977). 
Abu-Lughod (1990) indicates that within one decade the PLO achieved 
national, regional, and international legitimacy as the representative of the 
Palestinian people. Although the international influence of the PLO was 
limited, it became clear eventually that the PLO's participation in 
negotiations was central to diplomacy in the region. Since the 1973 war, 
several wars have broken out between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
During these wars, most notably the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the 
PLO has had practice in leadership and has been able to enhance its 
effectiveness among Palestinians in the occupied Arab land as well as 
among Palestinians out of Palestine. Moreover, Palestinian decision makers 
have become increasingly independent in the absence of intervention by Arab 
leaders. "With the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli-Arab 
conflict was, little by little, turning into an Israeli-Palestinian conflict" 
(Gresh, 1983, pp 2-3). 
On the other hand, growing international support for the Palestinian 
cause has promoted the PLO’s integration into international diplomacy. On 
the eve of the 1973 war, the Non-aligned Movement Summit recognized the 
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PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. African nations have 
also, after about 20 years, begun to align themselves with Palestine instead of 
with Israel. Western Europe, hit by the oil embargo, reconsidered its position 
on the Palestinian question. The UN recognized the rights of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination, in 1970 and to struggle 1971. The USSR weighed 
heavily and directly on the debate with the PLO. All of these indications have 
given the PLO a central position in the history of modem Palestine (Gresh, 
1983). 
Abu-Lughod states that the Palestine National Charter, adopted in 1964 
by the Palestine National Council, became the main constitutional document 
enabling the PLO to follow its strategies aimed at gaining Palestinian 
national rights. The primary concern of this charter is in regard to Israel 
and to Israel's Jewish population in Palestine. In the context of the Palestine 
National Charter, Palestinian rejection of Israeli statehood was and remains 
political rejection and denial of the legitimacy of Palestinian statehood and 
the return of the Palestinians to their homeland. Abu-Lughod also mentions 
that in November 1974, Yaser Arafat, chairman of the PLO, conveyed in his 
speech before the General Assembly a new proposal of coexistence between 
the two peoples. A gradual evolution in the Palestinian perspective was 
reflected in the PLO's political programs between 1977 and 1987. "This trend 
led inevitably to the adoption by the Council of the Political Program of 1988 
and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence" (p. 257). Israel's response 
to these developments within the Palestinian movement was denial of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination, to representation by the PLO, to 
independence, and to sovereignty in any part of Palestine. 
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Said (1990) in a discussion of what has frustrated the Palestinians, 
states that the expropriations of land, the increasing control over water, and 
the encroachments of Jewish settlements are among the daily pressures 
under which Palestinians suffer. The Camp David Accords brought about no 
Palestinian independence as the U.S. and Israeli authorities had said. 
According to some analysts, what ensued was "a series of pointless 
negotiations with phantom Palestinian inhabitants from the occupied 
territories who could never be identified or promised anything" (p. 263). 
Said also indicates that, as time passed, the Israeli occupation of West Bank 
and Gaza hurt the Palestinians more and more. Among those particularly 
hurt were the students, because of the extended closing of schools and 
universities, and whose status was relatively subservient and and whose 
salaries were much lower than those of Jewish workers. 
There was a proliferation of over a thousand laws and regulations 
designed not only to enforce the subaltern, rightless position of the 
Palestinians under Israeli jurisdiction, but also to rub their noses 
in the mud, to humiliate and remind them of how they were 
doomed to less-than-human status. Books by the thousands were 
banned, the colors of the Palestinian flag were outlawed, even the 
word 'Palestine' could earn its user a jail sentence (1989, p. 263). 
Shahak(1990), referring to a system of computerized magnetic identification 
cards issued in the West Bank and Gaza Strip states that ‘This totalitarian 
system, which should be called computerized tyranny, has no equivalent 
elsewhere in the world” (p. 15). 
Abu-Lughod (1990) points out that "Israel’s policy of political negation of 
any Palestinian initiative, coupled with a policy of terrible repression, 
exploitation, and continuing dispossession of the Palestinians, eventually led 
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to the intifada of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza" (p. 261). At the 
same time, Palestinian economic hardship was an obvious factor in the 
uprising. It has been reported that the police in al-Nasera City found 40 
Palestinian workers living in a two-room house (Ghallab, 1990). 
Ghallab reports that according to Israeli policy in the occupied 
territories, when a crime is committed against Arabs by an Israeli, the 
Israeli Government either describes the criminal as a "mad" Israeli or 
records the crime against an anonymous person. David Ben Gurion 
described Begin and Shamire as "mad" men after their terrorist activity at 
the King David Hotel; but the two "mad" men later became respected Prime 
ministers of Israel. The crime of burning al-Aqsa Mosque was also 
committed by one such "crazy" man. On December 8, 1987, an Israeli truck 
driver attacked four Palestinians in their car and killed them. As usual, the 
crime was recorded against an anonymous person. This crime, however, 
was the spark that ignited the current four-year Palestinian intifada . 
Rejection of the Status Quo 
The Palestinians rejected the status quo through their intifada (popular 
uprising), an event that many analysts have described as a revolution. Bir 
Zayt University philosophy professor, Sari Nuseibeh, states that 
the intifada is not just a Palestinian story, it is a human will, the 
strength of the national will, and the strength and the value of the 
call for freedom. It is a commonly held view now that 9 December 
1987 witnessed what can be characterized as a great and 
spontaneous popular explosion, manifesting itself in the furious 
outpouring of unarmed masses into the streets, in brazen 
defiance of death itself (p. 16). 
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According to Talhami (1990), the intifada began as "pitiful acts of stone¬ 
throwing by Palestinian youths, otherwise unarmed, [which] quickly turned 
into a total civil war that, though fought with unequal armor, proved to be a 
serious threat to the occupying power" (p. 23). 
The intifada has also contributed to national identity by encouraging 
dialogue across the factional fence and at the community level, among people 
from a variety of sectors and backgrounds. Despite the economic difficulty, 
600 Palestinian police officers resigned from their jobs. To declare 
independence, "tens of thousands of activists, school teachers, unionists, 
student leaders, professors and others, were already in goal. But even inside 
the prisons, the process of organization and deliberation continued" (p. 16). 
What surprised world observers most is that, within weeks of the 
intifada eruption, it was institutionalized as an organized challenge against 
Israeli authority. Therefore, the question arose as to who was behind the 
intifada . 
While many Western and Israeli analysts of the relation between the 
Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunis and the internal leadership of the 
intifada have emphasized the political distance between the two leaderships, 
the PLO has reacted as responsibly to its constituency and as effectively as 
could have been anticipated, considering both its 2,000-kilometer distance 
from the occupied territories and Israeli obstacles to communication 
(Cobban, 1990). 
Within five weeks of the outbreak of the uprising, the external 
[PLO] leadership had put into place an inside-the-territories 
coordinating mechanism that institutionalized the intifada and 
sustained a situation of effective dual power within the territories 
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throughout the two years of harsh Israeli countermeasures. The 
leadership's ability to do this stemmed from the appropriateness 
of the organizing strategies that the PLO—and in particular, 
Fatah's Khalil al-Wazir-had been pursuing in the territories 
through the previous four years (Cobban, 1990, p. 232). 
It is believed that Abu-Jihad, the second in-command Khalil al-Wazir, 
was the man who consulted with, aided, and blessed the creation of the 
Unified Command, which consisted of four leaders, each representing one of 
the major Palestinian organizations within the Occupied Territories: Fatah, 
the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party 
(PCP). Whereas the Unified Command was an inside-the-Occupied- 
territories coalition of four major nationalist groups, other nationalist groups 
active in the Palestinian Diaspora were not represented in this coalition, 
groups such as the financially supported Syrian and Iraqi group, Saiqa, the 
Arab Liberation Front, and other small groups such as the Palestine Popular 
Struggle Front and the Palestine Liberation Front. 
Although Israeli officials have claimed to have the leaders of the 
intifada in custody, underground leaflets have remained an effective means 
of organizing and institutionalizing the uprising. Another tool that has 
ensured the continuation of the intifada has been communiques broadcast 
via the Unified Command radio. The general purpose of the leaflets and the 
radio calls has been to give instructions regarding how to sustain the intifada 
challenge against the Israelis. These instructions have normally included 
general guidelines regarding how to reduce consumption of Israeli products, 
and how to deal with collaborators, as well as strike hours and a schedule of 
special events or remembrances. The total calls for strike have ranged from 
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three hours per day to five days per month. The Islamic Resistance 
Movement has also designated three strike days per month (Cobban, 1990, p. 
209-210). 
Although none of the Islamic movements was included in the Unified 
Command at the beginning of the intifada, the Islamists' role is becoming 
increasingly effective. The active Islamic political movements in the 
occupied territories are the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad, 
which split off from the Brotherhood Movement in the mid-1960s. 
The Unified Command, which had attempted at the beginning of the 
intifada to enlist the two major Muslim movements, welcomed the recent 
inclusion of both movements in its declarations. The relationship did not 
continue long, but the participation of Islamic Jihad in the intifada occurred 
in parallel with Unified Command efforts (Cobban, 1990). 
Unlike Islamic Jihad, for the first few months of the intifada, the 
Brotherhood remained on the sidelines searching for a proper Muslim 
stance. 
By August 1988, the most powerful local leader of the Brotherhood, 
Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, had reached a momentous decision. That 
month, he announced the formation of HAMAS, a new 
organization that would take a much more active role in the 
intifada than that which the Brotherhood had taken until then" 
(Cobban, 1990, p. 215). 
Since this declaration, HAMAS participation has closely followed the Unified 
Command efforts, although some minor disagreements between the 
organizations remain. HAMAS has laid out a periodic timetable for its own 
strike days although because the children have lost so much education, the 
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organization does not insist that they observe the schedule of general strike 
days (Shadid, 1988). 
Despite major differences particularly regarding the question of the 
liberation of all Palestine, including areas occupied in 1948, the Islamists 
and the nationalists agree that the sole Palestinian representative is the PLO. 
HAMAS has moved closer to the PLO and has markedly softened its view of 
PLO leadership, to the extent that the head of HAMAS now refuses to assume 
the role of the Palestinian representative or to negotiate independently of the 
PLO. Accordingly, Israeli authorities declared HAMAS a "terrorist 
organization" and arrested its head, Yasin (Cobban, 1990, p. 216). 
Although the primary challenge to the Muslim Brotherhood came from 
the Islamic Liberation Party and from the Islamic Jihad, there are other 
Islamic Parties in Palestine. These are hizb al-Tahreer al-Islami, al-Jihad 
al-Islami, Jamat al- Tabligh, Slafiyyun al-Takfir wal-Hijra, and Sufis 
(Shadid, 1988). 
In its third year, the intifada headed in the direction of civil 
disobedience. In its fourth year, the intifada is heading rapidly towards 
military revolution. Through communique No. 65 of the Unified Command, 
the uprising has already received a new direction, which is the use of "all 
means" against the occupiers. Many estimate that the Palestinian intifada 
has reached the stage of no return. They come to this conclusion because the 
Palestinians have nothing to lose and because both the Jews and Arabs in 
Palestine agree that separation is the only solution. These developments 
have led to military revolution. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although many television news scholars believe that much of 
television's power and importance as a source of news comes from its visual 
impact, few content analyses of television news video have been conducted. 
Most of these studies have ignored visual images altogether, dealing only 
with the typed, transcribed content of the words spoken on the air. Adams 
(1978) categorized the visual images of television news as one of two types: 
production factors and event factors. By production factors, he referred to the 
aspects of the visual image by and large under "direct technical control of 
news personnel themselves, especially camera crews and editors." In 
contrast, event factors have nothing to do with the production dimension. 
Adams's definition of event factors is "those that are outside of direct network 
control" (p. 158). Adams says the President's pronouncement in the White 
House Rose Garden illustrates an event factor by that setting, along with 
such things as the President's appearance, clothes, manner, and remarks. 
These dimensions, according to Adams, are out of the media's control. 
Conversely, media personnel do have control over "close-ups, long shots, 
camera angles, cutaways, reaction shots, editing and juxtaposition" (p. 158). 
These, of course, are the production aspects of the final visual image that 
require technical and aesthetic decisions by network news-makers. 
The literature review shows that little attention has been given to 
studying the event-factors approach to visual images in newscasts. 
Hofstetter (1976) gives attention to the nature of the 1972 U.S. presidential 
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campaign shown on the evening news. Stories about the fundamental 
political parties and campaign organizations have been classified according 
to whether crowds in the stories have been favorable toward the event. If a 
story included crowds in the pictures performing activities predominantly 
favorable to the campaign, the story would be classified as one including 
favorable crowds. Otherwise, it would be included in the "not favorable" 
classification. This category included stories neutral or ambiguous, as well 
as stories clearly unfavorable to the campaign efforts of the parties (1976, p. 
126). 
Hofstetter found that crowds were more frequently favorable in stories 
about Republican party efforts than in stories about Democratic party efforts. 
On CBS, about 71 percent of the stories about the Republican party, in 
comparison with 62 percent of the stories about the Democratic party, 
included predominantly favorable crowds. On NBC, 74 percent of the stories 
about the Republican party, in comparison with 66 percent of the stories 
about the Democratic party, contained favorable crowds. And on ABC, 69 
percent of the Republican stories and 60 percent of the Democratic stories 
showed predominantly favorable crowds (1976, p. 127). 
The event factor, or the nature of the event, emerged once more as an 
important factor in Paletz and Bison's examination of 1972 Democratic 
National Convention coverage. They noted that "part of the negative effect 
obviously was a function of the Democratic convention itself. For the first 
time in the history of televised conventions, viewers saw and heard (or heard 
about) such issues as abortion and homosexuality debated on the floor" (1976, 
p. 128). 
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Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Israel, has been among the 
extraordinary events occurring in the Middle East. There was heavy 
television coverage of that event. O’Conner (1977)wrote that this event 
"apparently offered little in the way of concrete political resolutions, but it left 
the world with a new collection of unforgettable images" (p. 17). Bagnied and 
Scheider's (1981) study of the U.S. television network news coverage of 
Sadat's visit to Israel and the events surrounding the trip examined the 
visual images as well as the air time. They found that Sadat was shown on 
screen more than twice as much as Begin during the period from November 
9,1977, through December 1,1977. They concluded however, that such a 
ratio did not indicate an unfair treatment of Begin, for several reasons: the 
event was understandably considered Sadat's Peace initiative. "It was Sadat 
who made the trip. He was the first Arab leader to make such a gesture, and 
he was subjected to bitter threats from certain quarters" (p. 60). Here we 
have the nature of the event as a strong factor contributing to the visual 
images. 
One of the factors that Bagnied and Scheider's study focused on was "on- 
camera activity." That is, "how much was each leader shown speaking, 
interacting with the public, gesturing with arms and hands, sitting being 
interviewed, or shown as the recipient of public acclaim?" (p .60). Although 
Begin was pictured as more than twice as likely to have been lecturing 
groups of people as Sadat was, the findings of this study show that Sadat was 
shown as more outgoing, open, gregarious, popular, and active. 
Furthermore, Sadat was depicted as interacting more, mingling more, 
consulting assistants more, shaking hands more and listening more to 
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people (12 percent of his on-camera activity). Sadat was also observed as 
encountering supportive crowds far more often than Begin was. Unlike 
Begin, Sadat consistently emerged as the more visually open and expressive 
leader: he used open-palmed, open-armed gestures (1981, p. 61). If these 
findings reflect anything, it is that the event factor derived basically from the 
event itself. According to Diamond and Cassidy (1979), "the figures of Sadat 
and Begin represented a reversal of symbolic images. Urbanic, pipe¬ 
smoking, English-speaking Sadat not only looked western but sounded 
statesmanlike when he talked of peace. Begin, on the other hand, appeared 
as a remote, even fanatical figure" (p. 7). 
Audiovisual compatibility is another aspect that may contribute to 
examining event factors in television news. Television is a two-channel 
medium. Both audio and video contain content that the communicator wants 
the audience to perceive. From the standpoint of TV viewers, psychological 
research reveals that the interaction between the audio and video portions of 
a television newscast may not be a simple one. Selective attention theory 
shows that human information processing is limited by a restricted capacity 
filter between the recognition and attentive stages of input analysis, so that 
only one among the audio and visual channels can be fully analyzed, 
interpreted or given meaning (Broadbent, 1958). 
The development of this theory led to two significant amendments. 
Unattended channels are not entirely ignored and the low level monitoring of 
views still continues and switching attention from one channel to smother 
takes time (Davis, Moray, and Treisman, 1961; Broadbent, 1971). 
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The television producers have taken advantage of the mechanism of the 
television message to "consciously and effectively employ distractions to 
minimize the impact of certain messages" (Adams, 1978, p. 165). In an 
analysis of network Vietnam stories, Frank (1973) discovered that video 
coverage did not totally parallel the content spoken by correspondents. 
The studies cited earlier and others about the interactions between the 
audio and video portions of TV news stories ignored the contribution of an 
event factor of visual image or audio-video reinforcement. This study 
however, hypothesizing that within extraordinary events, reinforcement 
between the audio and visual content is more likely to occur because 
television producers have less control to consciously distract the impact of the 
message. 
One of the extraordinary events in the Middle East is the Palestinian 
uprising of the Occupied Arab Territories, which exploded in December 1987 
and has not yet been quenched. This uprising has flooded the U.S. television 
networks with powerful pictures reflecting the seriousness of the 
circumstances and the hardships of Palestinian life. These powerful images 
are assumed in this study to be derived from the nature of the event (event 
factors). 
To determine whether TV coverage of the Palestinian uprising is a one¬ 
time event coverage (the event factors), we will compare two types of events 
during two different time periods in terms of the visual images and the 
interaction between the audio and visual content: 
1) extraordinary events, the first year of the Palestinian uprising (January 
1,1988-December 30,1988) and; 
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2) ordinary events, the year before the Palestinian uprising (December 1, 
1986-November 30,1987). 
Hypotheses 
General hypothesis 1 
There is more qualitative and quantitative television coverage of event 
during the extraordinary period than there is during the ordinary period. 
Hla There will be more television news stories covering the first year 
of the Palestinian uprising than there will be covering the Palestinian-Israeli 
issue the year before. 
Hlb There will be more television news stories using video during the 
first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be the year before. 
Hlc Television news stories covering the first year of the Palestinian 
uprising will be longer than the news stories during the year before. 
General hypothesis 2 
There will be more visual images of the nature of the event during an 
extraordinary period than there are during an ordinary period. 
H2a There will be more television news stories depicting Israelis as 
heavily armed soldiers and Palestinians as unarmed civilians during the 
first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the year 
before. 
. H2b There will be more television news stories of crowds of people 
during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the 
year before. 
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H2c There will be more television news stories depicting physical 
clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians during the first 
year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be during the year before. 
H2d There will be more television news stories conveying an emotional 
message during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there will be 
the year before. 
General hypothesis 3 
The audio and visual content conveys the same picture of reality. If 
there are differences between the two dimensions, only one can be 
appropriate (Kepplinger, 1982). Within an extraordinary event, 
reinforcement between the audio and visual content is more likely to occur 
because television producers have less control to consciously distract the 
impact of the message. 
Ha There will be more television news stories conveying audio-visual 
reinforcement during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there 
will be during the year before. 
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CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter is devoted to a discussion of content analysis, objective of 
the study, unit of analysis, the sample, coders and coding, operational 
definitions, and data analysis. 
This is a content analysis study of how the Columbia Broadcasting 
System (CBS), the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), and the National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC) covered the Palestinians and the Israelis 
before and after the Intifada. 
The Objectives 
The research effort had three major objectives. The first objective 
attempts to determine the total number of news stories broadcast by ABC, 
CBS and NBC, how many of these stories were accompanied by video, and the 
average length of the news stories and other descriptive data the three 
American television networks aired. The study examines the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict during the first year of the Palestinian uprising (the 
extraordinary event period) and compares the coverage by the same three 
networks of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one year prior to the Palestinian 
uprising (the ordinary event period) 
The second objective sought to measure the event factor contribution to 
the visual images of television news during the year of the Palestinian 
uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the contribution of 
event factor to visual images of TV news during one year prior to the 
Palestinian uprising (the ordinary event period). 
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The final objective attempts to measure the impact of the event factor on 
the audio-video compatibility of TV news during the first year of the 
Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the 
impact of the event factor during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising 
(the ordinary event period) 
Content Analysis 
This study employs the content analysis method defined by Krippendorf 
(1980), i.e., a research technique for making replicable and valid references 
from data to their content. In his precise definition Kerlinger (1973) 
described three characteristics of the method that require elaboration. The 
model is 1) systematic-the content to be analyzed should be selected on the 
basis of explicit and consistently applied rules; 2) objective-the personal bias 
of the researcher should not enter into the findings; and 3) quantitative-the 
content should represent messages accurately. This technique has been 
popularized by the recent concern over the portrayal of violence and the 
treatment of minority groups on television (Wimmer and Dominick, 1987). 
The analysis of content itself, however, does not provide the 
determinants or consequences of that content. 
Unit of Analysis 
In this study, we used the news story as the major unit of analysis. The 
story was selected as the essential unit of analysis because it is "the smallest, 
completely self-contained message in a news program" (Hofstetter, 1976, p. 
27). For this study, stories were identified and relevant data such as date, 
network, and length were recorded. 
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To obtain data, the researcher used Vanderbilt University's Television 
News Index and Abstract as the source of news. It became necessary to 
define the boundaries of the news stories presented in the News Index, which 
arranges newscasts according to news stories or groups of stories separated 
by headlines. Beneath the headline, each story is tagged "S" for studio or 
anchor. The names of the anchorperson or correspondents are given in the 
right margin. In the left margin, the time of the beginning and ending of the 
story is given. 
Stories broadcast in the evening network television news during two 
years (December 1,1986-November 30,1988) were considered as the universe 
for all obtained data. 
The Sample 
There is no perfect method of television news sampling. However, after 
the available methods were reviewed, stratified sampling seemed most 
appropriate for this research. According to Rubin (1981), stratified sampling 
is basically random sampling within various strata or subgroups of 
populations. It requires classifications categorized into subgroups according 
to preselected criteria (p. 73). Sample size is also an important factor. Pride 
and Clarke (1973) selected one day at random from each week through a two- 
year period. According to Asi (1981), the study of television with the smallest 
sample is that conducted by Robert Howard, who analyzed the content of 
network television news for five weekdays March 20-24,1972. Stempel, in his 
classic study of sample size, argued that a sample greater than 12 days for 
the entire year gives little advantage (1952). 
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The researcher was convinced that, for the purpose of this study, a 
24-day period (12 days for each subsample) would be sufficient. The 24-day 
sample produced two 12-day subsamples. One subsample was drawn from 
the year before the Palestinian uprising (December 1, 1986-November 30, 
1987) and, the other one from the first year after the uprising. One month 
(December 1987) was not included in the sample because the Palestinian 
uprising exploded in the middle of this month, which prevented us from 
classifying this month with either subsample. 
Originally, we planned to select the first day from each month 
throughout the two-year period. Only few news stories fell on that date, so 
we tried the 15th day of each month, instead. But this did not provide more 
than five stories in either subsample. Because, this study does not deal with 
the frequency of news coverage, in each month, we selected the first news 
story available in the News Index from each of the three television networks 
for each month. The total news stories making up the first subsample was 
16. The total news stories making up the second subsample was 36 
(Appendix C). 
Coding and Coders 
Coding for hypotheses la, lb, and lc of this study was accomplished by 
this researcher because these hypotheses rely on data available in the News 
Index for the three networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC (Appendix D). However, 
coding for hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 3 was accomplished by coders. 
Three graduate students from the Department of Journalism and Mass 
Communication at Iowa State University were asked to participate in the 
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study as coders. Before the coders met for the first time, the researcher 
requested and received from Vanderbilt University's News Archive, 
videotapes of all stories falling on the sampled days that concerned 
Palestinians and Israelis. The coders were trained and instructed on how to 
use the instrument before they observed the news stories. They were given 
operational definition sheets. Coder instruction sheets were distributed 
(Appendix E). The coders were also instructed to complete specially prepared 
coding sheets (Appendix F). The coders were trained and instructed on how 
to code both video and audio as two contents within each news story. After 
reviewing the visual content and coding each variable (equality of power, 
crowd, physical clash, and emotional message variables), the audio content 
of each news story for each variable was coded as either reinforcing or not 
reinforcing content. Without a certain degree of reliability, decisions reached 
by the coders would decrease the generalization of these decisions. To 
measure intercoder reliability, a pretest was conducted before the actual 
coding took place. There were three pairs of coders pretested. The pretest 
intercoder reliability of the first pair was .86 percent. The pretest intercoder 
reliability of the second pair scored .83 percent. The pretest intercoder 
reliability of the third pair scored .95 percent. The entire intercoder 
reliability among all coders was .95 percent. 
Operational Definitions 
Well-defined concepts and precise vocabulary are a milestone in the 
process of any research. Therefore, the following definitions were prepared 
to reflect the exact usage. 
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News storv: Any event or incident involving both Palestinian and Israeli 
individuals, groups, leaders or general affairs was considered a news story 
and recorded as such. 
Storv type: Any news story reported from outside the studio was 
recorded as a news story with video. If a news story was read by an anchor 
sitting in the studio or if it was accompanied by still graphics, it was recorded 
as a story without video. 
Inequality of power: Any news story involving armed Israeli soldiers 
and unarmed Palestinian civilians in a face-to-face position was considered a 
story implying inequality of power. 
Crowds: Any news story involving groups of people (not fewer than 10 
persons) performing collective activity such as rallies, marches, 
demonstrations, strikes, or prayers was considered a news story with 
crowds. 
Physical clashes: Any physical confrontation involving both Israeli 
soldiers and Palestinian civilians, such as stories involving chasing, 
capturing, beating, pushing, pulling, shooting, using tear gas or any type of 
gas among crowds of civilians, demolishing houses or throwing stones was 
considered as a news story with a physical clash. 
Emotional message: Any event indicating emotional dimensions, fear, 
sadness, or sympathy, such as stories involving weeping, screaming, 
bleeding, mourning, or self-flagellation was considered as a news story with 
an emotional message. 
Other relevant data such as date, network, and length were also 
considered. 
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Date: The day, month, and year of each story was considered in a six¬ 
digit format. Two digits represented the day, two represented the month and 
the last two represented the year (Appendix F). 
Network: Each network for each story was identified by a number. 
Three networks were included in this category: ABC = 1; CBS = 2; NBC = 3. 
Storv duration: The time length of each story was recorded in seconds. 
For the entire two years, the researcher found that the shortest story was 10 
seconds long and the longest 740 seconds. 
Data Analysis 
Data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSSx) at the Iowa State University Computation Center. The data we had 
gathered were nominal and interval. 
All of the hypotheses required a statistical procedure. Chi-squares were 
determined to assess the contribution of each variable. For the first 
hypothesis, the chi square was computed to test the relationship between the 
independent variable (two event periods) and the dependent variables (the 
number of the news stories, and the news accompanied by video). For 
subhypothesis lc, a means test was employed to obtain the average of news 
story length aired by the three networks. 
The chi-square was also computed in the second hypothesis to assess the 
relationship between the the independent variable (two event periods) and the 
dependent variables (equality of power, crowds, physical clashes, and 
emotional messages). 
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Finally the chi-square was computed for the third hypothesis to test the 
relationship between the independent variable (two event periods) and the 
dependent variable (audio-visual compatibility). 
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CHAPTER V. THE FINDINGS 
As indicated earlier, this research had three major objectives. The first 
objective required no sampling. All news stories aired by ABC, CBS, and 
NBC and available in the News Index during the two event-periods were 
recorded. Of these stories, 291 involved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Chi-square and means tests were used to assess the relationships between 
independent and dependent variables, with the p level at a standard 
statistical level (p < .05). 
The second and third objectives entailed a random stratified sample 
drawn from the previously mentioned two event-periods. The researcher 
recorded only 52 news stories. It should be noted that every statistical 
technique is sensitive to sample size: a large sample produces a difference 
even if the actual difference is very small, but a small sample produces a 
statistically significant difference only when the actual difference is great 
(Singletary and Stone, 1988). Because there was a small sample for the 
second and third objectives, p level was established at the standard statistical 
level (p < .10). As indicated earlier, to determine whether hypotheses were 
supported, the chi-square was used to test the relationships between 
independent and dependent variables. 
General Hypothesis 1 
General hypothesis 1 states that there is more qualitative and 
quantitative television coverage during an extraordinary period than during 
an ordinary period. It was thus hypothesized that, in comparison with the 
previous year (December 1,1986 - November 30, 1987, the ordinary time), the 
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first year of the Palestinian uprising (January 1, 1988 - December 30,1988, 
the extraordinary time) would have a higher rate of qualitative and 
quantitative television coverage. 
Hla 
Hypothesis la stated that there would be more television news stories 
about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the first year of the Palestinian 
uprising than there had been during the year preceding the uprising. Table 
3 shows a big difference between the two periods in terms of the total number 
of news stories reporting the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While 20 news 
stories were aired during the ordinary period by the three TV networks, 272 
news stories were aired by the same three networks during the extraordinary 
period. In other words, the three TV networks aired as many as 13 times 
more news stories during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary 
period. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported. 
Table 3 also shows the differences between the two periods, at the level of 
each network. With ABC, the number of news stories aired increased from 7 
during the ordinary period to 109 during the extraordinary period, which 
means that ABC aired 15 times more news stories during the extraordinary 
period than during the ordinary period. With CBS, the number of news 
stories increased from 6 aired during the ordinary period to 84 during the 
extraordinary period. CBS broadcast 14 times more news stories during the 
extraordinary period than during the ordinary period. With NBC, the 
number of news stories increased from 7 during the ordinary period to 78 
during the extraordinary period, which means that NBC aired 11 times more 
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Table 3. Total number of news stories aired by ABC, CBS, and NBC during 
two year periods (December 1,1986-November 30,1987, and 
January 1,1988 - December 30,1988) 
The Two Event-periods 
Network 
Stories Before 
Uprising 
Stories During 
Uprising Total 
ABC 7 109 116 
CBS 6 84 90 
NBC 7 78 84 
TOTAL 20 272 291 
news stories during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary 
period. 
Although these three networks were nearly identical in terms of the 
number of news stories aired during the first period (ABC = 7, CBS = 6, NBC 
= 7), there was no such similarity during the second period. ABC aired more 
news stories (109) than did either CBS (84) or NBC (78). 
Hlb 
Hypothesis lb stated that there were more television news stories 
accompanied by video during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than 
there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation 
between the number of news stories accompanied by video and the two event- 
periods was used. Table 4 shows that there is a relationship between the two 
event-periods and accompanied video of news stories with significance level 
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Table 4. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two 
event-periods 
Video Accompaniment 
The Two Event-periods 
Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories without video 6 9 
40.0 60.0 
30.0 3.3 
Stories with video 14 262 
5.1 94.9 
70.0 96.7 
Chi-square = 21.93381; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0000; min E.F. = 1.031; 
cell with E.F. < 5 = none. 
of p = 0.0000, which is lower than the established p level (p = 0.05). Hence, 
Hlb is supported. 
Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news 
stories without video is 30 percent and the percentage of news stories with 
video is 70 percent in favor of the stories with video, during the extraordinary 
period the percentage of news stories without video is 3.3 percent and the 
percentage of news stories with video is 96.7 percent in favor of stories with 
video (see Table 4). 
Networks seem to be quite different in terms of their coverage of the two 
event-periods crosstabulated by video accompaniment. With ABC, while 
during the ordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 
42.9 percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 57.1 percent in 
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favor of stories with video, during the extraordinary period the percentage of 
news stories without video is 6.6 percent and the percentage of news stories 
with video is 94.5 percent in favor of the stories with video (see Table 5). 
With CBS,while during the ordinary period the percentage of news 
stories without video is 16.7 percent and the percentage of news stories with 
video is 83.3 percent in favor of the stories with video, during the 
extraordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 2.4 
percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 97.6 percent in favor 
of stories with video (see Table 6). 
With NBC, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news 
stories without video is 28.6 percent and the percentage of news stories with 
video is 71.4 percent in favor of the stories with video, during the 
extraordinary period the percentage of news stories without video is 1.3 
percent and the percentage of news stories with video is 98.7 percent in favor 
of the stories with video (see Table 7). 
Hlc 
Hypothesis lc states that there were longer television news stories 
covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the first year of the 
Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. To determine the 
accuracy of this prediction, a means test was used for both periods. Table 8 
shows that there is relationship between the two event periods and the news 
story length with significance level of p = 0.000, which is lower than the 
established p level. Hence, Hlc is supported. 
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Table 5. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two 
event-periods on ABC 
The Two Event-periods 
Video Accompaniment Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories without video 3 6 
33.3 66.7 
42.9 6.6 
Stories with video 4 103 
3.7 96.3 
57.1 94.5 
Table 6. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two 
event-periods on CBS 
The Two Event-periods 
Video Accompaniment Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories without video 1 2 
33.3 66.2 
16.7 2.4 
Stories with video 5 82 
5.7 94.3 
83.3 97.6 
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Table 7. Crosstabulations between video accompaniment of stories and two 
event-periods, on NBC 
The Two Event-periods 
Video Accompaniment Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories without video 2 1 
66.7 33.3 
28.6 1.3 
Stories with video 5 77 
6.1 93.9 
71.4 98.7 
Table 8. Means and news story-length during two event-periods 
Period News Stories 
Mean 
(seconds) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Before the Uprising 20 39.0000 47.4508 
During the Uprising 271 131.1808 97.7709 
The total of both periods 291 124.8454 97.9447 
Significance = 0.000; F = 17.4326; mean square = 158265.9010 
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Furthermore, the average news-story length during the extraordinary 
period was 131.1808 seconds, whereas during the ordinary period it was 
39.0000 seconds. These findings indicate that the average length of news 
stories aired during the period of the uprising was greater than the average 
length of news stories aired during the period before the uprising. 
At the level of each network, average length of news stories was 
generally greater during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary 
period (see Table 9). 
General Hypothesis 2 
General hypothesis 2 states that the nature of the event is reflected more 
during the extraordinary period than during the ordinary period. 
H2a 
Hypothesis 2a states that there were more television news stories 
showing Israelis as heavily armed soldiers and Palestinians as unarmed 
civilians during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there were 
during the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used 
between the "power equality" variable and the two event-periods. Table 10 
shows that there is no statistical significance in the relationship between the 
power equality variable and two event-periods variable. The significance 
level is 1.000, which is greater than the established p level. Therefore, H2a is 
not supported. However, this test is not scientific because there is an 
insufficient case (one cell has fewer than five (2) stories). 
On the other hand, while during the ordinary period the percentage of 
the news stories with equality of power is 20 percent and the 
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Table 9. News story-length means on the three TV networks during the two 
event-periods 
Network Period 
News 
Stories 
Mean 
(seconds) 
Standard 
Deviation 
ABC Before the Uprising 7 17.1429 7.5593 
During the Uprising 109 124.8624 113.6952 
CBS Before the Uprising 6 38.3333 30.6050 
During the Uprising 84 146.1905 91.6897 
NBC Before the Uprising 7 61.4286 71.7469 
During the Uprising 78 123.8462 77.2621 
Table 10. Crosstabulations between two event-periods and "power equality" 
The Two Event-periods 
Power equality Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories with equality of power 2 7 
22.2 77.8 
20.0 24.1 
Stories without equality 8 22 
of power 
26.7 73.3 
80.0 75.9 
Chi-square = 0.0000; D.F. = 1; significance = 1.0000; min E.F. = 2.308; 
cell with E.F. <5 = 1. 
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percentage of news stories without equality of power is 80 percent in favor of 
the news stories without equality of power, during the extraordinary period 
the percentage of news stories with equality of power is 24.1 percent and the 
percentage of news stories without equality of power is 75.9 percent in favor of 
stories without equality of power. This can perhaps be interpreted as despite 
the insufficiency of the cases under examination, there is a light difference 
between the two periods presenting the contribution of the extraordinary 
event to TV images. Another interpretation can be attributed to the fact that 
the inequality of power between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been 
the case even before the uprising. 
H2b 
Hypothesis 2b stated that there were more television news stories 
presenting crowds during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than 
there had been during the year before. To test this hypothesis, a 
crosstabulation was used between "crowds" variable and "two event-periods" 
variable. Table 11 shows that there is no statistical significance in the 
relationship between crowds and two event-periods. The significance level is 
0.7906, which is greater than the established p level. Therefore, H2b is not 
supported. However, this test is not scientific because one of the cells has 
fewer than five (3) stories. 
On the other hand, while during the ordinary period the percentage of 
the news stories with crowds is 72.7 percent and the percentage of the news 
stories without crowds is 27.3 in favor of the stories with crowds, during the 
extraordinary period the percentage of news stories with crowds is 82.8 
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Table 11. Crosstabulations between two event-periods and "crowds" 
Crowds 
The Two Event-periods 
Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories with crowds 8 24 
25.0 75.0 
72.7 82.8 
Stories without crowds 3 5 
37.5 62.5 
27.3 17.2 
Chi-square = 0.07053; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.7906; min E.F. = 2.200; 
cell with E.F. <5 = 1. 
percent and the news stories without crowds is 17.2 percent in favor of 
stories with crowds. Despite the insufficiency of the cases under 
examination, there is a difference between the two periods presenting the 
contribution of extraordinary event to TV images. 
H2c 
Hypothesis 2c states that there were more television news stories 
presenting physical clashes between the Israeli soldiers and the Palestinians 
during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year 
before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation was used between physical 
clashes variable and two event-periods variable. Table 12 shows that there is 
statistical significance in the relationship between physical clashes and two 
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Table 12. Crosstabulations between the two event-periods and "physical 
clash" 
The Two Event-periods 
Physical Clashes Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories with physical clash 5 23 
17.9 82.1 
45.5 79.3 
Stories without physical clash 6 6 
50.0 50.0 
54.5 20.7 
Chi-square = 2.88998; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0891; min E.F. = 3.300; 
cell with E.F. < 5 = none. 
event-periods. The significance level is 0.0891, which is lower than the 
established p level. Thus, H2c is supported. 
Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of the 
news stories with physical clashes is 45.5 percent and the percentage of the 
news stories without physical dash is 54.5 percent in favor of the stories 
without physical clashes, during the extraordinary period the percentage of 
the news stories with physical clash is 79.3 percent and the percentage of the 
news stories without physical dash is 20.7 percent in favor of the stories with 
physical dashes (see Table 12). This can be attributed to the contribution of 
the extraordinary event to TV images. 
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H2d 
Hypothesis 2d states that there were more televised news stories 
presenting emotional messages during the first year of the Palestinian 
uprising than there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a 
crosstabulation was used between "emotional message" variable and two 
event-periods. Table 13 shows that there is statistical significance in the 
relationship between emotional message and two event-periods. The 
significance level is 0.0693, which is lower than the established p level. 
Therefore, H2d is supported. However, this test is not scientific because there 
are not sufficient cases (one cell has fewer than five (1) stories). 
Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of the 
news stories with emotional message is 9.1 percent and the percentage of the 
news stories without emotional message is 90.9 percent in favor of the stories 
without emotional messages, during the extraordinary period the percentage 
of the news stories with emotional messages is 46.4 percent and the 
percentage of the news stories without emotional messages is 53.6 percent in 
favor of the stories without emotional messages (see Table 13). This can also 
be attributed to the contribution of the extraordinary event to TV images. 
General Hypothesis 3 
General hypothesis 3 states that natural drama, which comes from the 
event itself, within an extraordinary event reduces the ability of the television 
producers and reporters to dramatize the events in accordance with their 
political and ideological attitudes. 
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Table 13. Crosstabulations between the two event-periods and the 
"emotional message" 
The Two Event-periods 
Emotional Message Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories with emotional 1 13 
message 
7.1 92.9 
9.1 46.4 
Stories without emotional 10 15 
message 
40.0 60.0 
90.9 53.6 
Chi-square = 3.29953; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0693; min E.F. = 3.949; 
cell with E.F. <5 = 1. 
H3a 
Hypothesis 3a states that there were more television news stories with 
audio-visual reinforcement during the first year of the Palestinian uprising 
than there had been the year before. To test this hypothesis, a crosstabulation 
was used between "audio-visual reinforcement" variable and "two event- 
periods" variable. Table 14 shows that there is statistical significance in the 
relationship between audio-visual reinforcement and two event-periods. The 
significance level is p = 0.0002, which is lower than the established p level. 
Therefore H3 is supported. 
Furthermore, while during the ordinary period the percentage of news 
stories with audio-visual reinforcement is 29.5 percent and the percentage of 
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Table 14. Crosstabulations between the "audio-visual reinforcement" and 
the two event-periods 
The Two Event-periods 
Audio-visual Reinforcement Before Uprising During Uprising 
Stories with audio-visual 13 72 
reinforcement 
15.3 84.7 
29.5 63.7 
Stories without audio-visual 31 41 
reinforcement 
43.1 56.9 
70.5 36.3 
Chi-square = 13.54925; D.F. = 1; significance = 0.0002; min E.F. = 
20.178; cell with E.F. < 5 = none. 
the news stories without audio-visual reinforcement is 70.5 percent in favor 
of the stories without audio-visual reinforcement, during the extraordinary 
period the percentage of the news stories with audio-visual reinforcement 
63.7 percent and the percentage of the news stories without audio-visual 
reinforcement is 36.3 percent in favor of the stories with audio-visual 
reinforcement (see Table 14). This can be attributed to the impact of the 
extraordinary event on the TV coverage. 
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CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether there is a long¬ 
term shift in the U.S. television coverage of the Middle East conflict, or 
whether such a shift is derived only from one-time coverage. The 
justification for understanding this study rested in the potential and 
importance of event factor impacts on television coverage and the event factor 
contribution to the visual images of television news and the differences 
between their impacts and contribution during two different periods: 
ordinary event period and extraordinary event period. 
At the beginning of this section, it would be fruitful to return to the 
earlier stated three objectives and hypotheses relating to each objective to 
review and examine the results and some of their implications. 
Objective 1 attempted to determine the total number of news stories, how 
many of them were accompanied by video, the average length of news story 
and other descriptive data the three TV networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC— 
devoted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the first year of the 
Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the 
coverage of the same three networks of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 
one year prior to the Palestinian uprising (ordinary event period). 
Hypotheses relating to the first objective of this research were stated as 
follows: 
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Hla There were more television news stories covering the first year of the 
Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. 
Hlb There were more television news stories accompanied by video during 
the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year 
before. 
Hlc There were longer averages of television news stories covering the first 
year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been the year before. 
Objective 2 sought to measure the event factor contribution to the visual 
images of television news during the first year of the Palestinian uprising 
(the extraordinary event period) compared with the contribution of event 
factor to visual images of TV news during one year prior to the Palestinian 
uprising (ordinary event period). 
Hypotheses relating to the second objective of this research were stated 
as follows: 
H2a There were more television news stories depicting Israelis as armed 
soldiers and Palestinians as unarmed civilians during the first year of 
the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year before. 
H2b There were more television news stories of crowds of people during the 
first year of the Palestinian uprising than there had been during the 
year before. 
H2c There were more television news stories of physical clashes between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians during the first year of the 
Palestinian uprising than there had been during the year before. 
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H2d There were more television news stories presenting emotioned 
messages during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than there 
had been the year before. 
Objective 3 attempted to measure the impact of event factor on the audio¬ 
visual reinforcement of television news during the first year of the 
Palestinian uprising (the extraordinary event period) compared with the 
impacts of event factor during one year prior to the Palestinian uprising 
(ordinary event period). 
One hypothesis relating to the third objective of this research was stated 
as follows: 
H3 There were more television news stories with audio-visual 
reinforcement during the first year of the Palestinian uprising than 
there had been the year before. 
Information relating to Hla of this research showed that the three 
television networks gave more quantitative coverage (number of news stories) 
to the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the 
Palestinian uprising than the three networks gave to the same Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict during ordinary event period. This means that the 
quantitative coverage results from a one time event. 
The results relating to Hlb showed that the three television networks 
gave more qualitative coverage (video accompaniment) to the conflict between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Palestinian uprising than they 
gave to the same Israeli-Palestinian conflict during ordinary event period. 
This means the qualitative coverage also results from a one time-event not. 
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The results relating to Hlc showed that the three television networks 
gave more quantitative coverage (the length average of the news stories) to the 
conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the Palestinian 
uprising than they gave to the same Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 
ordinary event period. This also indicates that this quantitative coverage 
results from a one time-event. 
Data relating to the H2a showed that although the majority of the 
inequality of power contributing to visual images of TV news was during the 
extraordinary event period, no statistically significant relationships are 
discovered between inequality of power and two event periods. This can 
perhaps be attributed to the fact that the inequality of power between the 
Israeli soldiers and the Palestinian civilians has been the case even before 
the uprising, so it did not make a difference within the extraordinary event 
period. 
The results relating to H2b showed that although the percentage of the 
news stories with crowds was greater during the extraordinary event period 
than the percentage of news stories with crowd during ordinary event period, 
no statistically significant relationships are discovered between crowd and 
two event-periods. This can perhaps be attributed either to the fact that crowd 
is always an obvious feature of the confrontation between both peoples before 
and during the uprising or to the insufficient sample size of these data. 
The results relating to H2c showed that physical clashes variable was 
carried by TV news more during the Palestinian uprising than during the 
year prior to the Palestinian uprising. Therefore, the event factor 
contribution to visual images of TV news is more likely to be reflected during 
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an extraordinary event period than during ordinary event period. The event 
factor contribution to the visual images of television news results also from a 
one time event. 
The results relating to H2d showed that the emotional message variable 
contributed to visual images of TV news more during the Palestinian 
uprising than its contribution to the visual images of TV news during the 
year prior to the Palestinian uprising. The event factor contribution to visual 
images of TV news result also from a one time event. 
The results relating to H3 showed that the three television networks gave 
more audio-visual reinforcement coverage to the Palestinian uprising than 
they did the year prior to the Palestinian uprising. Therefore, there is more 
event factor impact on the coverage of an extraordinary event period. This 
means that the event factor impact on the news coverage result from a one 
time event. 
This shift in the U.S television coverage of the Middle East conflict in 
terms of more qualitative and quantitative coverage, more event factor 
contribution to visual images of television news, more event factor impact on 
television coverage within extraordinary event results from a one time event. 
This type of coverage of course does not reflect a long term shift in the U.S 
television coverage of the Middle East conflict and peoples because there have 
been several extraordinary events in the Middle East. This suggests that the 
long term conflict can receive two different types of television coverage. Both 
coverages are economically beneficial for the TV producers. 
1- Current long term coverage is influenced by two factors; the political 
and ideological attitudes of the anchorpersons, reporters, and producers and 
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the economic interest based on the audience interest, which in turn leads to 
advertisers money. Such coverage takes place mostly within ordinary events, 
television dramatization can be more easily controlled. 
2- Short term coverage results from extraordinary events, where there is 
inexpensive natural drama. This inexpensive natural drama meets the TV 
producers' interest in drama,but at the same time it is not nearly as subject 
to the control of TV producers (see Appendix G). 
As an organization, a television network has several departments 
including the news department. "The executive producer is on top of that 
and news reporters and camera crews are at the bottom" (Asi, 1981, p. 144). 
Ultimately, the producers and close associates are the ones who decide what 
news should be broadcast. Their judgments are usually affected by 
"importance to the domestic public, the number of people affected, audience 
interest, political balance, dramatic quality, and of course, freshness and 
timeliness" (Warner, 1968, p. 72). 
These dimensions that usually influence the producer's judgments are 
either causes or effects, or both causes and effects. However, all these 
dimensions are important in the networks' efforts to attract the money, 
which the television networks rely on totally to survive. 
In this age of technology, with the inexpensive availability of news 
sources and the easy access to ongoing events, gathering and reporting the 
news may not be a big financial difficulty. However, presenting the news in a 
way that differentiates between ABC, CBS, NBC, etc. and attracts a larger 
audience and consequently more advertisers is the serious financial 
challenge facing the producers. "The unique character of television coverage 
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suggests that heroes, conflicts, and dramatic structures will fit together into 
an overall pattern. Coverage would probably stress emotionalism, 
destruction, and pathos, at the expense of a more dispassionate discussion of 
the issue" (Roeh, 1981, p. 76). 
The scholars of communication distinguished long time ago between 
"news and truth, and between information and story journalism" (Nimmo 
and Combs, 1985, p. 15). The realities formulated through journalism to 
match the logic in each medium or "media logic." Mead (1934) noted that 
news has elements of dramatic characters of story journalism. "The media 
logic may be viewed as the logic of drama. The choices of format for reporting 
news in a given medium are choices of dramatic presentation" (Nimmo and 
Combs, 1985, p. 15). Reuven Frank, at the time executive producer for the 
nightly news programming at NBC, wrote a memo to his staff when they 
moved from a 15- to 30-minute format in 1963; “Every new story should, 
without any sacrifice of probity or responsibility display the attributes of 
fiction, of drama. It should have structure and conflict, problem and 
denouement, rising action and falling action, a beginning, a middle, and an 
end. These are not only the essential drama: they are the essential of 
narrative (Epstein, 1973, pp. 4-5). 
However, there are events, where drama does not minimize the 
presence of the main issue in the news story. These events must be 
extraordinary in terms of richness and intensity. Such events is a big and 
an inexpensive fish for the television producers. If TV news has to be 
dramatized as a TV producer purpose to meet the audience interest and the 
advertisers' money, the extraordinary event is probably cheaper drama to 
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feed the mechanism of night television news. This short term policy may 
sacrifice or contradict a long term policy of the TV network if there is any. 
The Middle East conflict "is highly problematic, but some dominant 
characteristics of television news language have made it even more 
problematic; or so, at least, it seems" (Roeh, 1981,p. 87). As indicated earlier 
in this research, Israel has enjoyed American media support and sympathy. 
This support and sympathy have been established and continued as a result 
of the factors we mentioned in chapter 1 of this research. These factors have 
led to created dramatization to benefit Israel and the Israelis during ordinary 
events especially before the new technology of news media. This 
dramatization has viewed the Israelis as "victims" and the Arabs as 
"aggressors" for the long term media policy. However, within the televised 
extraordinary events, the natural drama replaces the reporters' created 
dramatization, where the dramatized victims become aggressors and the 
dramatized aggressors become victims. 
Obviously when we compared the qualitative and quantitative coverage, 
event factor contribution, and the impact of event factor impact on the audio¬ 
visual reinforcement during the Palestinian uprising with the same factors 
before the uprising, we calculated a greater number of news stories, which 
most of them accompanied by video, and occupied longer time of the newscast 
during the uprising. This can be interpreted as a decision was made by the 
producers and the close associates to station network crew, where the 
extraordinary event takes place. As a result of the available crew, the 
number of the news stories increases and the video coverage of the events 
increases. Because the event naturally dramatic which attracts more 
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audience and advertisers and consumes less money, energy or effort, we 
found longer news stories occupying newscast, and less created 
dramatization. This in turn, reduces the ability to intervene in the news 
story content. 
Obviously the reporters intervention was clear within audio-visual 
reinforcement. During the extraordinary event period, the percentage of the 
news stories with reinforcement was 63.7 percent compared with 36.3 percent 
of news stories without audio visual reinforcement. During the ordinary 
event period,the percentage of the news stories with audio-visual 
reinforcement was 29.5 percent compared with 70.5 percent of the news 
stories without audio-visual reinforcement. 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1979 was an 
extraordinary event that has contributed to short term coverage of the Middle 
East. 
Beyond specific informational details, many of these stories were 
structured with an implied plot of aggressors versus victims. 
Active agents of a powerful part were opposed to passive, 
suffering participants. In this drama the latter group appeared 
to bear no responsibility for their fate. This pattern was 
suggested by both the visual and verbal grammars, and through 
the interaction of the two (Roeh, 1981, p. 87). 
There have been several studies that reached the same conclusions and 
attribute these conclusions to a new shift in U.S. television coverage of the 
Middle East conflict. These studies did not examine whether there may be a 
possible long-term shift, or whether such a shift is derived from a one time 
event coverage. 
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After examining the U.S. television coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict during two different periods, this research determines that such shift 
is derived from a one-time event coverage. While this research attributes this 
shift to a one time event coverage, it cannot deny if there is a long term shift 
either resulting directly from the coverage of the Palestinian uprising as 
extraordinary event, or resulting indirectly from the accumulation coverage 
of several recent extraordinary events, which may well have influenced 
American public opinion concerning the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
Conclusions 
Based on the findings presented in Chapter 5, certain conclusions cam be 
drawn concerning the three television networks' coverage of the Middle East 
conflict and the question of whether there is a long-term shift in the U.S. 
television coverage of the Middle East conflict, or whether such a shift if only 
derived from one-time event coverage. 
The findings show remarkable differences between the Palestinian 
uprising period and the year before the Palestinian uprising in terms of the 
qualitative and quantitative coverage (the total number of news stories, the 
stories accompanied by video, and the average length of news stories), the 
event factor contribution to the visual images of TV news (inequality of 
power, crowd, physical clashes, and emotional message variables and 
emotional messages variables), event factor impact (the audio- visual 
reinforcement) of television news in favor of the extraordinary event 
The current research findings indicate that the media coverage 
shift,which has been suggested by some recent studies, resulted from a one 
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time event coverage. Also this research suggests that the short term shift 
may lead to a long term shift either directly resulting from the Palestinian 
uprising as an extraordinary event, or indirectly resulting from the 
accumulation of several recent extraordinary events. 
Recommendations 
Understandably, there is no perfect model for solving sill questions 
relevant to the problem under investigation. This research is no exception. 
While the current research emphasizes the event factor contribution and 
impact on TV coverage during two different periods, it does not examine 
production factor contribution and impact during the two different periods. 
Therefore, further research about the contributions and the impacts of both 
factors is recommended. 
The current research considered news story as the unit of analysis to 
examine the relationship between the variables under investigation. For 
further research, it is recommended that individual scene be the unit of 
analysis especially with variables such as "audio-visual reinforcement". 
While the research attributes the short term coverage shift of long term 
conflict to the event factor itself, it does not examine the technological impact, 
which may have contributed to the short term shift of the Middle East 
coverage. Therefore, further research about media technology impact on 
changing the coverage is recommended. 
Although the researcher was convinced that a 24-day sample would be 
sufficient to examine event factor contribution and impact during the two 
different periods, it was realized at the stage of data analysis that the cases 
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with some variables were not sufficient to scientifically determine 
relationships between variables under examination. Thus, a larger sample 
for further research is recommended. 
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PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
Schematic Structure in 1970, as set up by Seventh Palestine National Council 
in Cairo, May 30-June 4,1970 
Source: Ward, Peretz and Wilson The Palestine State. 
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These are the ABC news stories of the first subsample available in the 
News Index. 
Date Start Stop Total Time 
Dec 4,86 5:52:50 5:53:10 20 
Mar 23,87 5:33:00 5:33:10 10 
May 8, 87 5:49:10 5:49:30 20 
Oct 28,87 5:49:20 5:49:40 20 
Nov 25,87 5:47:00 5:47:30 30 
These are the CBS news stories of the first subsample available in the 
News Index. 
Date Start Stop Total Time 
Dec 5,86 5:37:50 5:38:10 20 
Jan 9, 87 5:49:20 5:49:50 30 
Feb 12,87 5:41:00 5:41:30 30 
May 8,87 5:46:20 5:46:50 30 
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These are the NBC news stories of the first subsample available in the 
News Index. 
Date Start Stop Total Time 
Dec 8,86 5:46:20 5:48:00 100 
Jan 9,87 5:42:40 5:43:00 20 
Apr 13,87 5:51:20 5:51:50 30 
July 1,87 5:54:30 5:58:00 210 
Sep 16,87 5:45:30 5:45:50 30 
Oct 14,87 5:44:10 5:46:10 130 
Nov 25,87 5:47:10 5:47:20 10 
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These are the ABC news stories of the second subsample available in the 
News Index. 
Date Start Stop Total Time 
Jan 4,88 5:41:30 5:46:30 300 
Feb 1,88 5:38:30 5:40:50 140 
Mar 2,88 5:41:20 5:43:00 100 
Apr 1, 88 5:46:40 5:49:00 140 
May 4, 88 5:32:10 5:32:50 40 
June 6, 88 5:44:00 5:45:10 70 
July 5, 88 5:46:30 5:49:10 160 
Aug 1, 88 5:30:00 5:34:00 240 
Sep 15,88 5:50:50 5:51:10 20 
Oct 7,88 5:45:50 5:46:10 20 
Nov 8,88 5:51:10 5:52:30 80 
Dec 5,88 5:46:00 5:46:20 20 
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These are the CBS news stories of the second subsample available in the 
News Index. 
Date Start Stop Total Time 
Jan 1, 88 5:37:20 5:40:10 170 
Feb 1,88 5:39:10 5:39:20 10 
Mar 1, 88 5:32:50 5:34:30 100 
Apr 1, 88 5:41:30 5:44:20 170 
May 17,88 5:46:00 5:48:30 150 
June 6, 88 5:34:20 5:43:40 560 
July 21,88 5:47:00 5:49:10 130 
Aug 1, 88 5:49:30 5:51:50 140 
Sep 2,88 5:40:00 5:43:40 220 
Oct 7,88 5:49:20 5:52:50 210 
Nov 8,88 5:47:20 5:49:20 120 
Dec 9,88 5:38:40 5:41:50 190 
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These are the NBC news stories of the second subsample available in 
News Index. 
Date Start Stop Total Time 
Jan 4,88 5:42:50 5:45:10 140 
Feb 1,88 5:40:10 5:42:10 120 
Mar 4,88 5:43:10 5:46:00 170 
Apr 1, 88 5:37:40 5:39:30 110 
May 6,88 5:39:20 5:39:40 20 
June 3, 88 5:34:20 5:36:50 150 
July 19,88 5:44:10 5:45:30 80 
Aug 1, 88 5:37:10 5:41:10 240 
Sep 28,88 5:39:50 5:42:00 130 
Oct 7,88 5:47:00 5:49:30 150 
Nov 8,88 5:49:30 5:51:00 90 
Dec 9,88 5:40:10 5:42:30 140 
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101 
Coder Instructions 
Please read these instructions and keep in mind while coding. 
1. The objective of this coding is to record your general impressions of each 
news story. Please record your decisions of each category based on the 
entire scenes of each news story. 
2. Please, while coding, watch the video at all times. Your decision has to 
be based on both the audio and video dimensions of each news story. 
3. Don’t let extraneous factors, the personality of the anchor-person or 
reporter to sway your coding decision. The emphasis during this coding 
process is on the nature of the event factors. 
4. Please code individually. If any problem arises, bring it to the 
researcher’s attention. 
5. You need to always keep in mind the definitions of inequality of power, 
crowds, physical clashes, emotional message in addition to date, 
network, and length. 
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103 
No. 
Data Collection Sheet 
1. Date I I I I 
2. Story start story stop length 
3. Network is : 
ABC = 1, CBS * 2, NBC = 3 
4. Story is : 
Before the uprising = 1 
After the uprising = 2 
5. Story is 
with film = 1 
without film = 2 
# Video # Audio 
6. Story is : 
with equality of power = 1 
without equality of power = 2 
7. Story is  
reinforcing = 1 
none reinforcing = 2 
8. Story is : 
with crowds = 1 
without crowds = 2 
9. Story is  
reinforcing = 1 
none reinforcing = 2 
10. Story is : 
with physical clashes = 1 
without physical clashes = 2 
11. Story is  
reinforcing = 1 
none reinforcing = 2 
12. Story is : 
with emotional message = 1 
without emotional message = 2 
13. Story is  
reinforcing = 1 
none reinforcing = 2 
14. Please add any further comments you may have about any news story: 
Coder initials 
Coder initials 
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APPENDIX G 
TV Coverage of Long Term Conflict 
Extraordinary 
Event 
Economic 
Interest 
Political and 
Ideological 
Attitude 
I \ / 
Natural 
Drama 
Ordinary 
Event 
1 1 
Economic Creative 
Advantage Dramatization 
1 1 
Short term TV Coverage 
Shift Policy 
I l 
Long Term Shift 
